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PRESS ADVISORY

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry will speak to students and faculty of the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies on Monday, March 14, 1994 at 11:00 a.m. The event will take place in the Marvin Center Betts Theater, 800 21st Street, Washington, DC. Secretary Perry will speak on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union.

The event is open to the media. For additional information, contact Mike Freedman, Director of Public Affairs, George Washington University, 202-994-6463. An audio feed of the speech will be available at the Pentagon.

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NEWS RELEASE

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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PLEASE NOTE DATE

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Dr. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense
George Washington University
Monday, March 14, 1994 - 11:00 a.m.

Secretary Perry: Thank you very much, Steve.

When I was still a graduate student, many years ago, Dean Atchison wrote in his memoirs of being "present at the creation." He was referring, of course, to his tenure as the Secretary of State when America led the world in a bold program which was designed to contain communist expansion. Our leaders then had a vision, and the vision led them to establish the Marshall Plan and to create the alliance known today as NATO. These two programs, which we take for granted now as a done deal in history, were by no means obvious inventions at that time. But, they did help Europe get back on its feet after a truly devastating war, and they protected it in the decades to come from communist encroachment. They proved to be the anchors of our foreign and defense policy for more than 40 years.

Those of you who are now graduate students will, many years from now, look back on the present time and also be able to speak of being present "at the creation." Across Eurasia, new countries are being born. And, as we look at a territory that was once a monolithic Soviet empire, we see many new states. All of them struggling--struggling to become democracies, struggling to bring on a market economy, struggling to develop a multi-ethnic society.

This historic shift, which is happening all around us as we speak, has made it necessary for us to begin, in the United States, shaping a new set of security relationships that will replace the relationships that were created after the 2nd World War. And these new relationships--the creation of these new relationships--will define our security world for decades to come.

Most importantly, we are forging new relationships with Russia---moving beyond the containment policy of the Cold War to what we might call a pragmatic partnership based on the mutual interests of both of these great nations.

President Clinton has described our basic national interests in the reform of Russia and our engagement in that region. He has emphasized that it is in the national interest of the United States to work with Russia, to lower the nuclear threshold, to support the development of Russia as a stable democracy, and to help it develop a healthy market economy that can benefit both our peoples.

In foreign policy, we want Russia to be at peace with its neighbors and a constructive partner with the United States in international diplomacy. These are the policy views expressed by the President.

As the Secretary of Defense, I have a more narrow portfolio of interests. My principal priority is the protection and advancement of United States national security interests. It's from this vantage point that I view the developments in Russia today and contemplate how they affect us.

I can summarize this by stating four national security interests we have. The first of those is guaranteeing the nuclear safety of the enormous nuclear arsenal that is the lethal legacy of the Cold War. The second is preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction--not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological waepons. The third is maintaining regional stability in and among the nations that formerly made up the Warsaw Pact. Finally, avoiding the reestablishment of an antagonistic global rivalry with Russia.

In order to advance these national security interests, I will be leaving Wednesday for a week-long trip to four of these new nations--Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. I will use this trip to establish joint programs between ourselves and these nations that, on the one hand assist in achieving important national objectives of their own, while at the same time, advance the national security interests of the United States. These programs are the building blocks of an emerging partnership with these states, and in particular, an emerging partnership with Russia.

The challenge that we have is how to build this new, pragmatic partnership with a nuclear super power undergoing revolutionary changes, even as its empire dissolves. This is a daunting challenge.

I believe that we can meet this challenge if we stick to a policy that is based on two very important and fundamental principles. The first of those is realism; and the second is pragmatism.

By realism, I mean making a realistic assessment of Russia's future and how different outcomes could affect national security interests of the United States.

By pragmatism, I mean establishing a policy which moves our partnership with Russia forward in a way which is both flexible and open ended. We have to be prepared to deal with the evolution of the European security environment, whichever way it goes. We would prefer to stay on a course which is beneficial to Russia while, at the same time, advancing the national security interests of the United States. But other aspects of our programs constitute a hedge against the possible negative outcomes now underway in Russia.

To ground our policy in realism, let me look first of all at some of the basic realities about where Russia is today and its prospects for the future.

The Cold War really is over. The Warsaw Pact is gone, never to be rebuilt. The Red Army is back within the borders of Russia --half of its former size, and we no longer see it as a threat to Western interests. The Soviet Navy is preparing to sell for scrap metal the Kiev class aircraft carriers, and American companies are bidding on the job to convert these carriers into scrap metal. And the spread of communist ideology to the Third World has been halted. Whatever drives the future relationship between Russia and the United States, it is not going to be a competition in ideology.

These are all positive results, but there is much that has not changed with the end of the Cold War, the most important of which is the unchanged fact of the 25,000 nuclear weapons still in the hands of the former Soviet Union. These weapons, quite obviously, still have the capability of destroying the United States, indeed, destroying the entire world.

In the meantime, the Russian people are trying, in a few short years, to change from an authoritarian government to a democratic government; from a state-controlled economy to a market economy. They have succeeded in dismantling the controls of the previous system, but they have not yet established the controls of the new system.

In the late '30s the Italian philosopher Gramsci once said, "The old is dying, but the new cannot yet be born. In the meantime, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." That is what we are seeing in Russia today in this [interim] period: a great variety of morbid symptoms...a deeply divided political system with profoundly disaffected elites; economic uncertainty; and social dislocation.

The political instability has been amply demonstrated by the near coup by Rutskoi and his colleagues, and by the strong showing by Zhirinovsky in the recent parliamentary elections.

I've talked with many Russians in my visits over there, and foremost in their minds are the consequences of the collapsed economy that makes them doubt that they can meet their families' basic needs for food and shelter. One of the very important negative consequences of this collapsed economy has been the rise of the criminal element in Russia, which most of the citizens in Russia fear far more than they fear external threats.

Russia is struggling, and will continue to struggle with the historic changes underway in that great nation.

These are facts. These facts lead to several realities. Reality number one is that, even with the best possible outcome imaginable in Russia today, which is a fully democratic and market-oriented Russia, the new Russia will have interests different from our interests. Even with allies like France and Japan, we have rivalry and competition alongside our partnership, and so it will be with Russia.

Reality number two is that a worst case outcome is possible, and we must be prepared for it. It is possible that Russia will emerge from the turbulence as an authoritarian, militaristic, imperialistic nation hostile to the West. In such a situation, we could indeed see a renewal of some new version of the old Cold War. Russia without the Warsaw Pact, but still with a formidable nuclear arsenal.

Reality number three is that we in the United States cannot control the outcome of the struggle underway in Russia. Only the Russians can control that. But, we can influence it through a program of constructive engagement with Russia.

These three stark realities lead me to two very important conclusions, the first is that because the difference between the best possible outcome and the worst possible outcome is so important, we must make the strongest possible effort to try to influence it to a positive outcome. We owe this effort to ourselves, and we owe it to our children.

The second conclusion, though, is that because we cannot control this outcome, we must also have a strategy which hedges against the possibility of a negative outcome. So, our policies and our strategies have these two parallel components: trying on the one hand to influence events in Russia to a positive outcome; but on the other hand, being prepared to deal with a negative outcome if that were to happen.

Let me talk first of all about what we might do to influence a positive outcome in Russia. I'll do this by describing programs, cooperative programs

between the United States and Russia, which can have a beneficial result both for the United States and for Russia, where we can be partners instead of rivals.

Many critics have argued, some very recently in the OpEd pieces and in the media, that we can only be rivals of Russia; that the negative outcome is certain to happen and we should be prepared for that by gearing up to be only rivals. Basically, they look at our relationship with Russia as "zero sum." That is, if one gains, the other must lose.

I continue to believe that many aspects of our relationship can be positive sum. That is, both of us can gain from a positive result. Most important in this category of positive sum programs is the disposition of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal now located in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. All of these states, for their own benefit, have underway programs today to dramatically reduce this arsenal. Today our partnership with these states affords us the unprecedented opportunity to cooperate directly with them in eliminating these nuclear weapons which, indeed, are aimed at us.

The heart of this cooperative program of nuclear threats is the so-called Nunn/Lugar Program. This program is named after two clear-eyed senators--Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Richard Lugar--who have played a central role in shaping our policies towards Russia. The Nunn/Lugar program, interestingly enough, is funded out of the defense budget because they consider it--and I also consider it--defense by other means. We have programs in our defense budget which defend against attack by ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads on them. This is another way of defending against those ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, by eliminating them at the source. It's defense in the wholesale, you might say.

With the support of this program, nuclear warheads are being removed this very day from the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs in Ukraine, and are being shipped back to Russia for dismantlement and elimination. Reducing the nuclear threat does not get any more direct and any more immediate than that.

This program to eliminate nuclear weapons in Ukraine is a result of the U.S./Ukrainian/Russian so-called trilateral agreement, which was signed by President Clinton, President Yeltsin and President Kravchuk in Moscow in January. This provides for removing and dismantling all nuclear weapons in Ukraine. These nuclear weapons in Ukraine, in the aggregate, comprise the third largest collection of nuclear weapons in any country in the world today.

Our ability to use this so-called Nunn/Lugar program in working with the Ukrainians was critical, I would say essential, in securing their agreement for this

accord. Within weeks after signing it, the Department of Defense provided supplies to be used by the convoys carrying the warheads from the missile bases to waiting transport trains. Just last week the first trains left Ukraine carrying 60 nuclear warheads from the SS-19 and
SS-24 missiles into Russia for dismantlement.

On my trip next week, I plan to visit one of these ICBM sites, that is in the process of being shut down, to see the process first-hand and to see where our defense dollars are going, so to speak.

Similar efforts are underway throughout the Soviet Union. In Belarus, officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces, who formerly tended SS-25 missiles also aimed at the United States, are being trained, with our help, for new occupations as their bases are closed.

In Russia, American technicians are working with Russian counterparts to design technologies to safely eliminate chemical weapons, and to safely store the plutonium which is being removed from the dismantled nukes. At the same time, we have embarked on a program with the Russians to buy from them the highly enriched uranium which comes from the dismantled weapons. Our plan is to buy this uranium, reprocess it so it can be used with commercial reactors, and then sell it to the commercial reactor facilities around the world. This Nunn/Lugar program, then, shows vividly how cooperation and partnership with Russia, Ukraine, and other newly independent states can achieve their national objectives while, at the same time, enhancing our own security.

Another area that we're working cooperatively with Russia in particular is the area of proliferation. A strengthened non-proliferation regime will enhance the security of both Russia and the United States, and we now have an opportunity to move forward in fully integrating all of the newly independent states into a global, non-proliferation regime, and in the process, encourage responsible behavior in the export of sensitive, dual-use technology and armament.

Full participation by Russia and the other newly independent states in this new regime will require that they adhere to global non-proliferation treaties, the treaties that prevent the proliferation of missile technologies, chemical technology, biological technology. In return for this, Russia and these other states will get access to dual-use technology that will be very useful to them in the development of their commercial economies.

The third cooperative program which we have underway with these states has to do with a very active program in defense and military cooperation--the Defense Department and the Chiefs of Staffs in the United States have a program

with their counterparts in Russia. We believe that the military in Russia is and will continue to be a key player in any future developments in that country. Therefore, we are deepening contacts at every level between our two militaries as part of an effort to decrease suspicion and increase mutual understanding. We have more than four decades of distrust and suspicion that we need to work to erase. It will take us some time to do this.

We are opening channels of communication that we have never had before. For example, the so-called Partnership Line. This is a hotline on my desk in the Pentagon and on the desk of the Minister of Defense, General Grachev, in Russia where we can discuss crisis issues--areas where misunderstandings and bad communications might lead our two nations into further misunderstanding instead of resolving the issues.

This summer we will be holding peacekeeping exercises jointly with Russia. These will be held in the Volga Military District of Russia between troops of the American 3rd Infantry Division and the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Guard Division. This kind of practical joint training that caused these two units to come together so they could cooperate in a peacekeeping operation would have been absolutely inconceivable only a few years ago.

We're also cooperating in programs which help the Russians convert some of their defense production facilities, particularly their nuclear production facilities, to the production of civilian products. We're doing this by establishing joint ventures between American companies that are interested in manufacturing civilian products, and the Russian defense enterprises which are interested in converting over to the manufacture of commercial products but don't know how.

Russian defense assets such as land, infrastructure and manpower are being committed by the Russians and American know-how and market understanding are being committed by the American companies. This is a model program because it simultaneously reduces the threat to us, benefits our private sector, and promotes successful reforms in Russia.

To this point, I have discussed programs that we have in partnership with Russia that are beneficial to both countries. These programs help influence a positive outcome to the turbulence now underway in Russia. But even if that positive outcome is not realized, as long as these programs are continued, their results serve the security interests of the United States.

Closely related to these bilateral programs--programs between the U.S. and Russia or the U.S. and Ukraine--is a multilateral program which is called Partnership for Peace. Partnership for Peace offers the states of Central and

Eastern Europe--including the states of the former Soviet Union--a vehicle for building a security relationship with NATO. Nations that commit to this program identify the facilities, resources, and forces that they are willing to make available to the partnership. They must also identify what they intend to do to achieve civilian control of the military and to make defense budgets and policies transparent--that is making them visible to their citizenry and the citizenry of the world. By helping these nations, we help bolster their independence, and in so doing we help build a new Europe that is stable, secure, and free.

Partnership for Peace is part of our larger strategy of being prepared for the worst, even as we prepare for the best. It is designed to stimulate and reward Russia's integration into the partnership of nations if they choose that course. At the same time, it offers the states of Central and Eastern Europe a security relationship with NATO which could be the basis for a rapid and effective expansion of NATO.

We have been criticized for Partnership for Peace, by those arguing that our policy gives the Russians a veto over NATO policy because we did not immediately extend full NATO membership in response to the request for membership of Central European countries.

We've also been criticized as being much too aggressive, that our action on the Partnership for Peace would make Russia feel encircled. But I believe that by taking this realistic approach we got it just about right, and the criticism from both directions tends to support that point of view.

I have pointed out that besides these cooperative programs, we also need to have a hedge strategy--to hedge against the possibility of a negative outcome in Russia. And let me point out the first element of this strategy which has to do with our START Treaty. We are, in the Department of Defense, already underway with the implementation of START I, that is, the removal of the missiles from our force that are covered by that treaty. We're doing that even though the treaty has not yet formally entered into force, and we're doing it ahead of the reductions that are being made in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. We're doing this because even after the reductions to START I levels, our force would still be sufficient to deter an adversary of any conceivable size.

On the other hand, as a hedge, we have not begun implementing the START II reductions and will not do so until Russia undertakes comparable reductions. The very much deeper cuts in START II will affect modern systems like the Trident missile, and cannot prudently be made unilaterally. So we are holding off on that until we see the comparable reductions being made in Russia.

But the most important part of the hedge strategy for the United States is built into our defense program. That is why there are some items in our current spending plan that cannot be justified by the current threats we see in the world today. When I defend our budget in Congress I'm asked, "How can we justify spending for threats that do not now exist?" The answer to that basically is, some military capabilities have such a long lead time that we have to spend money on them now even though we don't need them right away, if we think there's some plausible possibility of needing them five or ten years in the future.

For instance, even though we are downsizing our force, the research and development portion of our budget, R&D, will stay higher than it was in the 1970's. Similarly, we're going to maintain a minimum essential defense industrial infrastructure so that we have the capability to reconstitute key elements of our military forces if that should ever be required. In particular, we plan to maintain a minimal production and R&D capability for nuclear weapons, even while we're in the process of dramatically reducing the number of nuclear weapons we have deployed. We plan to continue building nuclear submarines at a low rate, even though the current threat and our current replacement needs don't justify building new submarines until the year 2000. We are continuing to build Trident missiles at a low rate, and we're using tank upgrade programs to keep the tank industrial base warm. We're doing these things because you cannot mothball intellectual capital -- that's the basis for the R&D program -- and because it would take decades to reconstitute the critical elements of the industrial base if we had to do it from scratch.

These efforts give us a measure of protection against threats that may develop in the future, including the possibility of a hostile, militaristic Russia. But that's a potential problem in the future. In the near term, we will pursue our interests around the world, and we will find that very often our interests coincide with those of Russia's. Other times they won't. Still other times, they won't have much to do with each other at all.

This seems to be lost on some critics of the policy of constructive engagement with Russia. They say we've chosen to make Russia a partner when, in fact, we should be making them a rival. I contend that that is a false dichotomy. Russia can be both our partner and our rival and both at the same time.

We have to recognize that our relationship has elements of both. When our interests coincide we must push hard to engage the Russians and work together to advance our mutual goals. And when our interests are largely unrelated, we will each pursue our own agendas.

Of course, it's the area where the interests conflict that most concern me as the Secretary of Defense. All major powers, including friendly major powers, have interests that sometimes conflict. Winston Churchill during the Second World War noted that, "Even with allies, it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own." So it is with our allies, and so it will be with our partner in Russia.

We cannot expect Russia or any other great power to do things inconsistent with its own national interest, but we can expect Russia to recognize the benefits of being a responsible member of the world community. We can expect our two countries to prevent areas of disagreement from spoiling the broader relationship. And we can expect that disagreements are handled peacefully.

These are our expectations for relations with all major powers, and these should be the standard for the American/Russian relationship as well.

Recent events in Bosnia provide an excellent example of this. Several weeks ago as the NATO deadline for removing artillery from around Sarajevo was approaching, President Clinton, Secretary Christopher, and I each contacted our counterparts in Russia and asked for their help in getting the Serbs to comply with the deadline. We cannot say for sure what happened as a result of those contacts, but we can say that the very day those calls were made, the removal of artillery by the Serbs began seriously.

This experience, I believe, exposes the false dichotomy of partnership versus rivalry. Our interests in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia are very different from the Russian interests, but we have one common objective, which is accelerating a peace agreement there, and accelerating an end to that war. On the basis of that common objective we can work together to achieve this desirable conclusion. This conclusion which, by the way, has now led--after months and months of shells falling into Sarajevo of more than a thousand a day--we have now gone 30 days with no shells falling anywhere in Sarajevo.

So far, the United States and Russia have managed their differences to ensure that our overriding, common objectives take priority. That's the way it's supposed to work, and that's the way it is working.

In sum then, the framework for our policies is based on realism -- real facts, real interests, real priorities and real expectations; and it's based on a pragmatic approach which on the one hand works to assist Russia in areas beneficial to both of our countries, but on the other hand protects us from the negative outcomes. This is the agenda which I will pursue on my trip next week.

We understand that forging this relationship will be hard work. Just because something is hard doesn't mean we shouldn't try. Quoting Churchill again, he said, "No one can guarantee success in war, butonly deserve it." The same is true today about reform in Russia. We cannot guarantee the success of reform in Russia, but we ought to do all we can and they ought to do all they can to deserve it.

Graham Green once wrote that "There always comes a moment in time when a door opens and lets the future in." The ending of the Cold War has opened such a door. The future is out there, waiting to come in. America, our allies, and the states of the former Soviet Union should seize this moment and shape the future instead of being shaped by it.

Thank you very much.

Q&A to follow:

Q: Could you tell us some of the indications or trends you would look for in a turn towards the worst-case scenario in Russia, and events or processes that you would observe that would drive us away from the partnership and more towards the rivalry?

A: That's a very good question. The first comment I would make about that is how important it is to get early warning on those trends. And secondly, if we were isolated, separated, or standing aloof from Russia today, it would be virtually impossible to get those kinds of indicators with any confidence. The very things we're doing with Russia today -- the military-to-military contacts, working with them on the conversion of the defense industry, working with them on their nuclear weapon dismantlement. All of that cooperative activity puts us close, not only to the events, but to the people who are shaping the events. As a consequence, I think we would get very reliable early warning of any changes for the worse.

I think two specific events, which I'd look for, is a negative turn in the Parliament, particularly in the Duma, which seriously rejected the key reform programs that the government is trying to push through, and that seriously withdrew the support for these cooperative programs we're conducting with Russia. Part of my visit, by the way, will be not only meeting with government officials in Russia, but also I'll be meeting with the Duma in what I think is an unprecedented closed session, or joint session, of the Defense Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee in the Duma to discuss this whole set of issues with them. It is very clear that the Parliament in Russia will play a major role in the implementation of these programs, and I want to be sure we have their full support as we proceed forward.

I met with them, by the way, last week at the Pentagon--some of the leaders of these committees, the chairmen of the committees, and I am optimistic that we will have support from the leaders of the Duma. In fact, the chairman of the Duma introduced the discussion in the Pentagon by saying that the Duma today represents the strongest force within Russia today for reform. That's an interesting comment, because that's not the impression you would get from reading the media about what's going on in Russia today. But that's an interesting comment and I plan to follow that up much more carefully when I meet with them.

We would expect to also get indications from our military-to-military contacts of the military pulling back from those contacts instead of leaning forward as they now are. I think we'll have many indicators.

Q: Do you think that trans-Caucasia occupies any place in USA/Russian relations, and if yes, then what is it? And the second, what is your reason of solution of problem of Nagorniv Karaba? I want to say to you that I am from Armenia, a Fulbright Fellow in George Washington University School.

A: I'll start off by emphasizing what I said before, that we can influence events in the former Soviet Union, we cannot control them. When there are powerful forces unleashed, as there are in Armenia and Azerbaijan today, the influence we have may be modest, indeed.

We have taken a position, however, that the disputes in these nations, formerly of the Soviet Union, the territorial boundary ethnic disputes, ought to be dealt with by an international body, namely the United Nations. That, to the extent it requires peacekeeping forces, those peacekeeping forces will be mandated by resolutions by the United Nations and supplied by the United Nations, and that the military forces of Russia, to the extent they act in this, will be acting under that UN peacekeeping force and not in a freelance manner, and be a portion of the overall UN force.

That does not, by any means, deal with a whole set of questions of how to resolve the disputes they are bringing to a head, but that's the strongest statement I can make at this time about what the United States position is, relative to getting a resolution of the disputes in those territories.

Q: Do you believe there is any benefit to the United States seeking a modification in the ABM Treaty?

A: Neither the United States nor Russia today has any plans or aspirations for deploying a major continental defense system such as was envisioned by the ABM Treaty. Therefore, there would be no reason from that point of view to make any modifications to the ABM Treaty. Both Russia and the United States are fearful that there may be regional threats against them. In Russia, they

would be on their border, and in the United States it would be our forces in the field such as, for example, happened during Desert Storm. Therefore, both nations believe they need to have a theater ballistic missile defense capability. The United States program, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative, what used to be called the Strategic Defense Initiative--sometimes nicknamed Star Wars--has been dramatically changed in the last year to reflect that priority. First of all, the effort is reduced in total size. Secondly, what's left of that effort has been almost entirely focused to the development, production, and deployment of a theater ballistic missile defense system.

Now to get to your question, our only purpose in looking at the ABM Treaty today is to ensure that there are no ambiguities in that treaty that will prevent proceeding with an adequate theater ballistic missile defense system. And the language in the treaty specifies that that is permissible, but it specifies it in reasonably ambiguous language, so we think we may need some clarification to help define the technical difference between the two cases. The intent of the treaty is clear, but some clarifications of the details may be necessary.

Q: In the New York Times this morning there was a report of the delay that happened yesterday with ordering ground attacks in Bosnia. I was wondering...they reported that there might be some unwillingness to do that because it would raise tensions and also raise the implications for the United States. I was wondering what part we played in that delay, and if we were involved in the negotiation process within the UN.

A: Let me describe the facts as I understand them, first of all, and then try to answer your question.

A French peacekeeping force yesterday was attacked by what they believed to be Serb tanks and Serb artillery. It happened to be anti-aircraft artillery fired in a ground targeting role. They called for close air support to protect them from this attack. That call went to General Rose, who is the UN commander in Bosnia. He approved the request and forwarded it to General Cot, who is the commander of all the UN forces in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. General Cot, after due consideration, approved it and passed it to Mr. Kashi, who represents Boutros Boutros-Ghali in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The provisions call for his final approval on it. He, in turn, approved it.

That process, from the time the attack took place until the time the approval took place was three hours. This is not compatible with an effective close air support system. (Laughter)

In fact the NATO forces, which happened to be United States forces at that moment...at the moment of the attack, had a C-130 gunship circling the area--this is

the area of Behak. Not only circling it, saw the attack and visually spotted the guns, which were performing the attack--could have immediately brought them under fire. They continued to circle for the next three hours. By the time they got the approval, the guns were gone and the attack was over.

Now to get to the question, what can or should we do about that in the future. This is obviously not an effective way to manage a military operation in close air support. The United Nations resolution, which authorized close air support, has a provision which requires that the first such authorization has to go through this process that I've described to you. It's a tortuous process. It inevitably takes time, and in this case it took three hours. I think that's appropriate. I think that on the first time close air support is used, that it should have a complicated process like this to be sure that we are not over-reacting, we're using it right the first time.

Once that first time approval is approved, then I think later uses of it should be done more directly by having the request go to General Rose, the commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, from there directly to NATO, and NATO could authorize directly, and that would take minutes instead of hours, and could be quite effective.

So, I am in favor of a slow, cumbersome process the first time, but all successive times we ought to get, in order for it to be effective, we have to get a more streamlined command authority. That is permitted within the UN resolution the way it was written. Now we have to see whether it will be implemented in such a way that allows the efficient, timely use of close air support as I've described.

Q: I wanted to ask you to reflect on the problems of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and some of the issues that have come before us over the past year or so. It seems to me that we have had the useful benefit of experience. The question now is, "how do we apply that experience?" You mentioned the command and control problem, and the issue, probably, of getting a better operations center, or something like that in New York. There's that issue.

But, it seems to me that we have a problem in working out exactly the parameters of how, when, what, and why we do things in this peacekeeping arena. Your predecessor, as you know, had some words on the subject which were perhaps more forthcoming, or I shouldn't say forthcoming, they were rather aggressive. It seems to me that we have not backed away from that, but that we have had the benefit of actual experience.

You mentioned the idea of an exercise with the Soviets. We have the recent Bosnia experience as well.

Here we are, a year or so into this Administration, we've learned a great deal, but it's not been particularly well articulated. I would hope that you could perhaps say a few words about where you're going with this very useful concept of realism step by step, and so forth.

A: Let me apply it, generally, to the kind of peacekeeping operations and peacemaking operations that we are involved with, or are likely to get involved with, and see if we can generalize from there.

I think the single most important factor has not to do with working out the mechanics of the command and control relationships, which our military are very good at doing, if we unencumber them so they can do it. It has to do with getting our use of military power closely aligned with the political objectives that we have in the region, and therefore, it has to do, first of all, with stating clearly what our political objectives are and what they are not.

To be specific, in Bosnia we have limited political objectives and therefore, it is appropriate that the military power we're willing to use with that will be even more limited. The objectives in Bosnia are, first of all, most importantly, to do what we can to prevent that war from spreading beyond Bosnia, indeed, from spreading beyond the Balkans. We have two specific actions that we're taking that relate to that. One of those is the deployment of a peacekeeping contingent in Macedonia whose job is to observe the activities that are going on in that area along the border, and to serve as a deterrent to any spilling over of the war into Macedonia.

That's a small, but, I think significant way of furthering that objective of preventing the war from spreading. But the best way, the most important way of preventing this war from spreading, is to get it stopped before it spreads. Therefore, the most significant policy objective we have, and the one in which we're devoting most of our energy is finding ways to accelerate the peace process...that is moving through diplomatic efforts to try to bring the war to an end, and the efforts which we have conducted in the last three or four weeks, particularly working with the Muslims and the Croats, has led to an agreement to form a Muslim/Croat Federation and a confederation between Croatia. This new federation is an important step in that direction. Much remains to be done yet, in particular, bringing the Serbs into this agreement is a crucial, unsolved problem at this point.

That's our first objective then, and those are the two things we're doing to meet that objective.

Our second objective in Bosnia is, while these peace talks are going on, to do what we reasonably can do to reduce the casualties, the violence that's going on in that country. We're doing that, first of all, through three related air operations. The one which we were just talking about, which is to provide close air support to

the UN ground forces; the second one is designed to prevent the artillery bombardment of Sarajevo, which has now been successful for one month after a year and a half of shelling of that city which led to almost 50,000 casualties; and the third is the so-called no fly zone where U.S. and NATO airplanes enforce the provision that there will be no aerial bombardment of cities by demanding that there be no military airplanes in the air.

That agreement was reached ten months ago. Prior to that, there were numerous instances where Bosnian cities were not only getting artillery shelling, they were getting bombardment from the air. For the last ten months there has been no bombardment of Bosnian cities from the air because of our no fly zone...until a few weeks ago when six airplanes decided to test whether the no fly zone was effective. They did test it, and they found out it is effective. So, I don't think we're going to be seeing recurrences of that test.

In addition to that, all of these things are reducing the level of violence. We're also trying to do some things to mitigate the violence even when it happens, and that we are doing through relief operations. We have flown thousands of flights, airlift and airdrop flights into Bosnia. We have carried more food into Bosnia in the last year than we carried during the entire Berlin airlift into Berlin. This is a major relief operation,which is a companion piece to the UN relief operation on the ground, which is carrying food in in convoys.

So our policies, then, are simple to state; limited in objective; and to execute them then, we have made the major thrust on diplomatic, on peace negotiations. We have further been willing to use our air power in conjunction with NATO air power to limit civilian casualties while this is going on. We are not willing to use U.S. or NATO ground combat troops to storm the beaches in Bosnia or the former Yugoslavia and conquer the country and impose a peace settlement on it. We are not willing to do that now, and we won't be willing to do that a month from now,or a year from now.

So, we have limited objectives, and we have made a very judicial use of military power to achieve those objectives.

Thank you very much.

(END)